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ABSTRACT 
Wormhole attack is considered one of the most 
threatening security attacks for mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANET). In a wormhole attack, a tunnel 
is setup in advance between two colluders. The 
colluders record packets at one location and forward 
them through the tunnel to another location in the 
network. Depending on whether or not the colluders 
are participating in the network functions, the 
wormhole attack can be further divided into two 
categories: traditional wormhole attack and 
Byzantine wormhole attack. Existing researches 
focusing on detecting traditional wormhole attacks 
can be classified into three categories: one-hop delay 
based approach; topological analysis based or 
special hardware/middleware based approaches. 
Unfortunately, they all have their own limitations. 
Most of the researches detecting Byzantine 
wormhole attack are not addressing the Byzantine 
wormhole attack directly. Instead, they focus on 
observing the consequence after a Byzantine 
wormhole attack, like packet dropping or 
modification. In this paper, we propose to detect 
both traditional and Byzantine wormhole attacks by 
detecting some topological anomalies introduced by 
wormhole tunnels. Simulation results show that our 
scheme can achieve both high wormhole attack 
detection rate and accuracy. Our scheme is also 
simple to implement.  
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1. Introduction 
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) attracted a lot 
of attention recently in networking community. Most 
of the previous ad hoc networking research has 
focused on routing protocols and communication 
methods in a trusted environment. However, many 
applications need secured communication [1]. 
MANETs are vulnerable to a number of security 
attacks due to their flexibility in network 
configuration, openness of the wireless medium and 
absence of any centralized controller. Recently, there 
are many papers focusing on providing security for 
MANETs. Authors in [2] proposed a password-
authenticated group key exchange protocol for 
MANETs. Authors in [3] proposed two-layer INS 
concept to secure routing protocols. A detection 
framework called separation of detection authority is 
proposed in [4] for detecting selfish nodes on 
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MANETs. In this paper, we focus on one particular 
network layer attack: wormhole attack. Depending 
on whether or not the attackers are also actively 
participating in network layer functions, the 
wormhole attack can be further divided into two 
categories: traditional wormhole attack and 
Byzantine wormhole attack. In the traditional 
wormhole attack, an attacker overhears the packets 
in its vicinity, records them and then tunnels them to 
another location where they are replayed by another 
colluding attacker. As a result, two far away nodes 
consider themselves as one-hop neighbours. In the 
Byzantine wormhole attack, the attackers also 
participate in the network functions, like routing, 
flooding, authentication, etc. In Byzantine wormhole 
attack, when one colluder receives a packet, it first 
takes action according to the network function 
requirement, and then tunnels the packet to the other 
side of the tunnel. The other colluder, after receiving 
the forwarded packet from the tunnel, will then 
process it and then take appropriate action as if it is 
received from a direct legitimate neighbour. As the 
colluders also participate in all network functions, 
Byzantine wormhole attack is more difficult to 
detect. The motivation of this paper is to develop a 
unified scheme to detect both traditional and 
Byzantine wormhole attacks with high detection rate 
and simple implementation.  
As short wormhole links may not attract a lot of 
traffic and will not be of much use to the adversary 
[5], we consider the wormhole tunnel to be at least 
two hops long in this paper. As a wormhole tunnel 
will introduce some topological anomaly, we focus 
on topological analysis to detect such topological 
anomaly for detecting both traditional and Byzantine 
wormhole attacks. Simulation results show that our 
scheme can achieve both high wormhole detection 
rate and detection accuracy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
In Section 2, we review existing wormhole detection 
methods and their limitations. Our proposed solution 
for detecting traditional wormhole attack is 
presented in section 3. We extend our scheme to 
detect Byzantine wormhole attack in section 4. 
Finally, our conclusion is drawn in Section 5.  
2. Related Works 
Wormhole attack attracts a lot of attention in 
MANET security research community recently. In 
this section, we first briefly review existing schemes 
for detecting traditional wormhole attack. Then we 
move to cover the existing schemes for defending 
against Byzantine wormhole attack.  
2.1 Existing methods for detecting traditional 
wormhole attack  
Existing approaches for detecting traditional 
wormhole attack can be classified into three 
categories: one-hop delay based approach; 
topological analysis based or special 
hardware/middleware based solutions. 
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Schemes proposed in [6-12] are one-hop delay 
based. In [6], a wormhole detection method based on 
round trip time (RTT) and neighbour number is 
presented. When the RTT between two nodes is 
considerably longer, they check the neighbour 
number. If the value of neighbor number is greater 
than the average neighbor number, there is a suspect 
that a wormhole link is in between. This method 
assumes that all network nodes use the same 
hardware and software configuration. Moreover, 
they assume the network nodes are uniformed 
distributed, which may not be true in some mobile 
ad hoc networks. Schemes in [7-12] also rely heavily 
on measuring one-hop delays to detect wormhole 
attack. 
Another approach of combating wormhole attacks 
is to use graph analysis. Maheshwari et al. in [5] 
proposed a wormhole detection algorithm which 
looks for forbidden substructure in the connectivity 
graph that should not be present in a legal 
connectivity graph. Unfortunately, this approach is 
very complicated and impractical to real system.Lee 
et al. in [13] propose a method where each node 
gathers information of its neighbors within two hops. 
Each newly joined node broadcasts an 
announcement, which is valid only within the next 
two hops. The requirement of maintaining two hops 
neighbors, keyed hash and TTL limit the 
applicability of this method in a distributed system 
where exists a wide variety of participants. Dong et 
al. in [14] propose to analyse the topological impact 
introduced by traditional wormhole tunnels. 
Unfortunately, the presented detection scheme 
requires the network to run Dijkstra shortest path 
routing algorithm which may be a heavy burden to 
many mobile ad hoc networks.  
The solutions belonging to the third category of 
combating wormhole attack use a special hardware 
device, strict time synchronization or special 
network protocol. Packet leashes are used in [1] to 
detect and defend against wormhole attacks. 
However, the accuracy of GPS devices is low in 
presence of physical obstacles. Another detection 
method in [15] uses directional antennae to obtain 
relative directional information and verify possible 
neighbors. This method suffers from antenna s 
directional errors. In NEVO [16], a firmware up-
gradation of the MAC layer is needed so that the 
sender can passively monitor the forwarding of 
broadcast type packets by its neighbors. Moreover, 
NEVO uses network layer verification, which is a 
time consuming task. 
It can be seen that most of the existing traditional 
wormhole detection methods rely on measuring one 
hop delays. The major advantage of this type of 
solutions is simplicity and easy implementation. 
However, delays are not only caused by the presence 
of wormholes but also some other factors like link 
congestion, queuing delays, difference in intra-nodal 
processing capabilities etc. In our scheme, instead of 
only looking at the round trip delays, we turn to 
detect the topological anomalies introduced by the 
wormholes. Using this topological feature, we can 
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detect traditional wormhole tunnel with high 
accuracy.  
2.2 Existing methods for detecting Byzantine 
wormhole attack 
Most of the existing solutions for detecting 
Byzantine wormhole attack rely on encryption and 
authentication. As the compromised nodes will drop 
or modify the user packets, these solutions try to 
detect the dropped packets or modified packets to 
identify the Byzantine attacks. In ODBSR [17], 
reliability is chosen as the metric in routing. Each 
link and then path consisting of multiple links is 
assigned a weight. If the packet loss rate is over 
some threshold, the source launches the binary 
search to determine which link is in fault. The faulty 
link will be assigned a larger weight and eventually 
avoided in the future connection setup phase. In 
SRAC [18], the authors proposed an algorithm to 
detect Byzantine attacks by using both message and 
route redundancy during route discovery. Multiple 
copies of the same packet are received by a node. 
After comparing all multiple copies, it is possible to 
detect any missed or modified copies and identify 
the compromised nodes. Unfortunately, all these 
schemes are very complicated and only focusing on 
packet dropping or modification. If the compromised 
nodes are only interested in analysing traffic or 
spoofing, all these schemes fail. In our approach, we 
intend to address byzantine wormhole attack 
directly. We focus on detecting abnormal topological 
features introduced by byzantine wormhole tunnels. 
Therefore, it is possible that paths including 
Byzantine wormhole tunnels can be completely 
avoided and thus minimizing the adverse impact.  
3. Detecting traditional wormhole attack 
In this section, we present our proposed scheme 
for detecting traditional wormhole attack. This 
scheme will be extended to cover the Byzantine 
wormhole detection in section IV. Our scheme is 
based on the following two observations of 
traditional wormhole attacks: 
1) Temporal anomaly: Two fake one-hop 
neighbours with a wormhole tunnel in between have 
longer RTT, compared to the RTT between two true 
one-hop neighbours.  
2) Topological anomaly: Two true one-hop 
neighbours usually share common true one-hop 
neighbours among them, and two fake one-hop 
neighbours do not share common true one-hop 
neighbours.  
3.1. Neighbor List Construction 
Each node in the network maintains its own one-
hop neighbor list and average RTT (RTTavg) to its 
direct neighbors. The neighbor list consists of two 
parts: trusted and suspected. The nodes included in 
the trusted part are considered true direct neighbors 
while the nodes included in the suspected part are 
suspected as under the traditional wormhole attack. 
Nodes exchange HELLO and HELLO_REPLY 
packets for populating their neighbor lists. The 
HELLO packet contains the following fields: source 
node ID and sequence number. The 
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HELLO_REPLY packet contains the following 
fields: source field, destination field and sequence 
number. The details of the HELLO and 
HELLO_REPLY exchange are described in the 
following: 
1. The source node broadcasts a HELLO packet 
to its one-hop neighbors. 
2. A node receiving a HELLO packet unicasts a 
HELLO_REPLY packet back to the source 
node. 
3. After receiving a HELLO_REPLY packet 
from one neighbor, the RTT between the 
source node and the neighbor is first 
measured. Based on the relationship between 
the measured RTT and the maintained RTTavg, 
this neighboring node may be put into the 
suspected or trusted part of the node s 
neighbor list: if the measured RTT is greater 
than three times of the current RTTavg (RTT > 
3 × RTTavg), this neighboring node is included 
into the suspected part of the neighbor list; 
otherwise, this node is considered a trusted 
neighbor and RTTavgis updated. 
3.2 Calculating RTTavg 
Round Trip Time (RTT) is measured as the delay 
between when a HELLO packet is broadcasted and 
when the corresponding HELLO_REPLY is received 
by the initiator. 
Each node maintains an average value of one-hop 
RTT between itself and its one-hop neighbors. This 
value, denoted by RTTavg in this paper, is measured 
using the following formulae: 
   
3.3 SUS and TRST parts of a Neighbor List 
Based on measured RTT, we can populate the 
SUS and TRST parts of a node s neighbor list. 
However, the list may not be accurate enough as 
RTT is affected by many factors. We use topological 
comparison to eliminate as many as possible true 
neighbors from the SUSP part to improve the 
detection accuracy. 
3.4 Topological Comparison 
As we have noticed in observation 2), if two nodes 
are true one-hop neighbors, they usually share other 
common true neighbors. However, the nodes around 
a traditional wormhole tunnel get a distorted view of 
the network topology. Therefore, two far away nodes 
consider themselves as direct neighbors but this 
particular topological feature may not be held 
anymore. We can use this property to improve the 
performance of our scheme. 
If a node s SUSP part of the neighbor list is not 
empty, it sends ENQ packets to all nodes in its 
SUSP part of the Neighbor List. In response to 
ENQ, the recipients reply with their respective 
TRUS part of their Neighbor List back to the ENQ 
source. After receiving the reply, the node can use 
Algorithm 1 to conduct topological comparison. The 
parameters used are shown in Table I. 
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Table I parameters for Algorithm 1 
S Sender of ENQ packets 
r Receiver of ENQ packets 
TRUSs TRUS list of s 
TRUSr TRUS list of r 
me TRUE/FALSE, denotes whether 
s is in TRSTr 
trusted No. of nodes in TRUSr  TRUSs 
Algorithm 1 Detectingtraditional Wormhole 
1. ifme = TRUE  then 
2. Delete r from SUSPs 
3. Insert r into TRUSs 
4. end if 
5. else if me = FALSE then 
6.      if ( trusted=0 ) then 
7.      link with r contains wormhole tunnel 
8.      else 
9.      delete r from SUSPs 
10.      Insert r into TRUSs 
11.      end if 
12. end if    
3.5 Performance evaluation 
We use ns-2 to evaluate our scheme. And 
parameters are listed in Table II.  
Table II Simulation parameters 
Simulation area 1000m×1000m to 
1400m×1400m 
Number of nodes 10, 15, 20, or 30 
Transmission range 250m 
Routing algorithm AODV 
Simulation runs per 
scenario 
100 
We use detection rate and detection accuracy as 
performance measurement of our scheme. Figure 1 
shows the detection rate versus tunnel length for 
different network sizes. It can be seen that the 
detection rate increases as the tunnel length 
increases. It is because that, with longer tunnel 
length, the RTT between a pair of fake direct 
neighbours is longer and easier to be identified. It 
can also be seen that higher detection rate is 
achieved with larger network size. It is due to the 
fact that, with larger network size, each node has 
more genuine neighbouring nodes which leads to 
more accurate RTTavg estimation and thus less likely 
to misclassify fake neighbouring nodes as trusted 
neighbours. We also compared the detection rate of 
our scheme with that of scheme developed in [7] in 
Figure 2. It can be seen that our scheme achieves 
much better performance. It can also be noted that 
the improvement of our scheme is more significant 
when the tunnel length is short. It is because that the 
scheme in [7] relies on RTT only to detect wormhole 
attack. 
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Byzantine wormhole attack. As we have explained 
earlier, two nodes with a Byzantine wormhole tunnel 
in between consider themselves as three
neighbors. However, as in the traditional wormhole 
attack case, a Byzantine wormhole tunnel will also 
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involved in the pair s three-hop connection. 
However, the nodes around a Byzantine wormhole 
tunnel get a distorted view of the network topology. 
Therefore, two far away nodes consider themselves 
as three-hop neighbors but this particular topological 
feature may not be held anymore. Therefore, we can 
use this feature to detect Byzantine wormhole 
attacks in MANET. We modify the topological 
comparison algorithm we developed in section 3 for 
detecting Byzantine wormhole attack. 
Table III Notations used in Algorithm 2 
S Sender of ENQ packets 
r Receiver of ENQ packets 
SUSPs SUSP list of the neighbor list of s 
ONLs One-hop neighbor list of s 
TRUSr TRUS list of the neighbor list of r 
ONLr One-hop neighbor list of r 
me TRUE/FALSE, denotes whether s 
is in TRUSr 
trusteds No. of nodes in TRUSr  ONLs 
trustedr No. of nodes in TRUSs  ONLr 
Each node in the network has its own Neighbor 
List. After the neighbor discovery process a node 
sends ENQ packets to all nodes in its SUSP list of 
the  Neighbor List. In response to ENQ, the 
recipients reply with their respective TRUS part of 
their Neighbor List back to the ENQ source. After 
receiving the reply, the node runs Algorithm 2 for 
detecting the Byzantine attack. The parameters used 
in comparison are shown in Table III. In this phase, 
the TRUSparts of a Neighbor List is modified when 
a suspected node proves its credibility. 
Algorithm 2Detecting Byzantine Wormhole 
1. ifme = TRUE  then 
2.               Delete r from SUSPs 
3.               Insert r into TRUSs 
4.      end if 
5. else if me = FALSE then 
6.      if (trusteds=1 and trustedr=1 ) then 
7.      connection with r contains Byzantine 
wormhole tunnel 
8.      else 
9.               delete r from SUSs 
10.               Insert r into TRSTs 
11.      end if 
12. end if    
4.3 Simulation results 
We have also simulated our scheme with 
simulator ns-2 to evaluate the performance. 
Simulation parameters are similar to those shown in 
table II, except that the simulated area is limited in a 
square field of size 1000m * 1000m with 30 
randomly generated nodes.  
Figure 3 shows the detection rate versus Byzantine 
wormhole tunnel length. It can be seen that detection 
rate increases as tunnel length increases. It is 
because the RTT between a pair of fake three-hop 
neighbours is greater with longer tunnel length, and 
therefore easier to be identified. In Figure 4, the 
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detection accuracy versus tunnel length is shown. It 
can be seen that our scheme can achieve very high 
accuracy.  
Figure 3Detection rate vs tunnel length  
Figure 4Accuracy vs tunnel length  
4. Conclusion 
Wormhole attack is considered one of the most 
challenging and threatening security attacks in 
mobile ad ho networks. Most of the existing 
wormhole detection schemes focus only on 
traditional wormhole attacks. And they rely on 
observing longer RTTs between neighbouring nodes 
under the traditional wormhole attack which may 
lead to poor detection performance. Existing 
schemes for Byzantine wormhole attacks focus on 
the consequences of Byzantine wormhole attacks, 
like packet dropping and modification to detect the 
existence of Byzantine wormhole attacks. In this 
paper, we try to detect both traditional and Byzantine 
wormhole attacks directly. We propose to detect the 
topological abnormality introduced by the traditional 
and Byzantine wormhole attacks. By detecting 
wormhole attacks directly, those links under 
wormhole attack can be avoided completely during 
the routing phase and thus limiting the adverse 
consequence from wormhole attack to the minimum. 
Simulation results show that our scheme can achieve 
both high detection rate and accuracy of alarms. The 
implementation of our scheme is also simple.  
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